Political elite of Kazakhstan
Psychology of the regime - "After us the flood"

Nurbulat MASANOV

The pioneering days of sovereign Kazakhstan result in the formation of a new political elite that little by little has displaced the old Communist administrative nomenclature. This agonizing, difficult and conflicting process has been parallel to the process of national state construction, formation of "business elite" as well as the development of the political structure of the society.

The most significant landmarks on the way of the new form of statehood that should be regarded as an accomplished fact in its general structural parameters were the adoption of the two Kazakhstani Constitutions (in 1993 and 1995), almost 60% setback in production, the Supreme Soviet's transfer of additional (beyond the constitutional ones) authorities to the President in December 1993, 1000-fold depreciation of a ruble and over 30- percent tenge inflation, dissolution of two Parliaments, the extension of presidential tenure by 2000 in April 1995, falsification of 1999 presidential and parliamentary election, numerous economic and anticrisis programs, absolute compelling of legislative, executive, and court power to the President, his family and machinery, "macroeconomic stabilization", comprador privatization, legislative neoplasms, and, finally, Kazakhstani capital move to Akmola.

During the period of sovereignty Kazakhstani political elite has made its way from Communist administrative nomenclature that brought the country into economical dead-end to destructive, non-efficient, ethnocratic, despotic elite in 1992-1996 that completely brought to ruin the whole economic system through credits, non-payments, and corruption. Moreover, the process of Kazakh political elite transformation has been animated by President Nazarbayev himself, his family and the closest entourage. The creators of the process have seen their main task in 3 interconnected actions. Firstly, monopolization of authority of all the resources by the President personally, secondly, in devaluation of the authority of the old Communist administrative nomenclature that failed to acknowledge that it had lost its position, and, thirdly, in disavowal of the new bureaucracy influence through the imitation of the struggle against corruption.

To that end various kinds of bureaucratic departments merger and fusion have taken place. After having restructured the vertical and horizontal of all power structures the President has disturbed the influence and self-respect of bureaucratic class as a whole, and, which is of main importance, has deprived it of consolidation, set its various segments and bodies against one another, thus making the functionaries to compete struggling severely for resources, positions, and influence. The Procrustean bed of President's and his family's interests has been fit on all the bureaucracy and functionaries. And the capital's move to Akmola/Astana has crowned the process, as the old nomenclature with its relations, authority and influence has been left in Almaty out of collar. The class of new functionaries were most seriously draught before moved to Astana. The prevailing national ideology - the ideology of sovereignty - has underlaid the mobilization of administrative elite, as well as of the whole socium.

The principal feature of modern Kazakhstani sovereignty is that all the power is completely concentrated in the hands of the President - the power as a possibility to distribute resources and bureaucratic positions without any control. Actually, a system has been built to enable the President alone to give "uluses as a pork" which means, in the language of policy, the final transfer from a nomenclature system, where belonging to partocratic class opened all the official doors - to oligarchy where a Superior Suzerain alone, namely the President, personally decide upon the fate of officials. As a result, the frontal consolidation of Kazakh administrative and managerial elite around the President presenting the symbol of sovereign Kazakhstan has taken place.

In fact, today the only person embodies political elite of Kazakhstan - President Nursultan Nazarbayev. The class of public officers - functionaries that have been selected by the President personally and his family serves his political interests. Administrative and managerial elite, though rather heterogeneous, is knitted by the fact that it is composed of predominatingly of bureaucratic stratum of President's personal "clients" that hold the superior public offices. It is based upon the principle of assignation made by the President to all public positions, up to that at regional akimats, law enforcement bodies, courts and prosecutor's offices, the Cabinet, in some cases to the Senate, as well as the real control of the process of electing and the activities of all parliamentarians.

The model of Kazakhstani pattern of multidimensional relations with other individuals, groups, communities, and demos is based on the infrastructure of "patron-client" mutual relations, well-studied and wide-spread in many traditionalist and civilizationally backward countries. Usually, a patron and his clients are closely interconnected by bilateral exchange of resources, information, mutual help, services, money, responsibilities. Often a "client" of the patron do no know that others exist and so as a rule each thread knitting a patron and a client operates in autonomous, two-way vertical mode. Moreover, the functionaries are a success in being "the clients" of two - three and even more patrons.

In his turn, each "client" himself is to act as a patron in regard to TAXONOMICALLY inferior stratum of clients. To become "a good client of big patron" you have to be "a little patron" yourself. Otherwise you just cannot be "a good client of big patron" as their relations are based on the principle of "mutual utility" and the existence of their own information resources, services and other resources.

As a result today's administrative political elite in Kazakhstan has been formed as a "protectorship - client" system gravitating to oligarchic forms with a supreme patron on the top of the power pyramid, namely the President of the country. And the pyramid predominatingly consists of the administrative managerial elite. It goes without saying then so that N.Nazarbayev's, his family's and his closest entourage's staff policy plays the key role from this point of view.

President's staff policy is based, first of all, on the recruiting numerous relatives who compose the first stratum of the most influential officers, the most close to President. Akhmetzhan Yesimov, former Vice-Prime, Rakhat Aliyev - former head of tax police, now the Head of the Committee for National Security, Dariga Nazarbayeva, the Head of KHABAR national TV and broadcasting company, Timur Kulibayev, Altynbek Sarsembayev, etc. should be mentioned first of all. This part of political elite is the most aristocratic and the most close for the society's control.

The second stratum is a very thin layer of technocrats, soon depoliticized administrators and managers who acquaint themselves to the ABCs of market economy, budget, monetary and financial policy, mechanisms and methods of privatization, as well as of the modern technologies of money-laundering and concealment of financial resources. It is this stratum that is to provide for the economic system operation in accordance with restricted clannish, restricted family and mercenary interests of the above mentioned aristocratic part of political elite.

Naturally, the best technocrats are foreign advisers as they seem to have no political ambitions, they are non-legitimate in public perception, can not participate in political processes and moreover to compete for political leadership in Kazakhstan. The most shining example is that of A. Mashkevich, Israeli citizen, and his companions. Among Kazakhstani technocrats, one should mention Uraz Djandosov, Ex- First Vice-Prime and ex-head of the Agency for Foreign Investments, Sauat Mynbayev, Minister for Agriculture and former Minister for Finance, Mukhtar Ablyazov, ex-Minister for Energetics, Trade and Industry, Mr. Yertlesov, ex-Deputy Minister for Economics, Zeinulla Kakimzhanov, Minister for Public Revenues, Nurlan Kaparov, head of KEGOK state company and former Minister for Oil and Gas Industry, etc. Often demos perceives managers and technocrats as non-legitimate and just representing business structures.

And the third stratum, the President stakes at in his staff policy is the functionaries themselves, non-legitimate from the viewpoint of public consciousness and the bureaucratic class itself. Who is non-legitimate then? Non-legitimacy of bureaucracy and , moreover, its inability to pay more or less independent role in society's and state political life, is characterized in accordance with the principle of "binary opposition" (Levi-Strauss_ and on the basis of various features - ethnic (the Kazakh - non-Kazakh, clannish (Superior and Medium - and Junior zhuzes), regional )capital - province) , age (mature, of advanced age - and green, young), social and economic (gentlemen - sons of business), etc. This stratum is subject to rotation to the greater extent then other segments of the political elite of Kazakhstan. It is also rather heterogeneous in comparison with other parts of the political elite of KazakhstanIt. This stratum is characterized by the greatest heterogeneity, internal conflicts and the most intensive competition.

All serious and independent individuals capable of defending or having their own viewpoint have been estranged from public and political sphere - that is an obvious effect of President's staff policy. In other words, public machinery impersonality has been carried to the extreme. Outstanding intellectuals, scholars or just persons famous for their significant works, scientific tractates or even bright ideas have been poorly represented in today's political elite. As a rule, they are "bureaucratic blood" not interested in adequate perception of social realty in the interest of the nation and state. Their task is to match restricted clannish and family interests of the President his family and closest entourage.

In this connection you can not deny the fact that the President himself is not very fond of outstanding individuals and, moreover, seeks to make away with them at his earliest convenience. The appointment Murat Auezov an Ambassador to China and his further resignation of current Executive Director of Soros - Kazakhstan Foundation, diplomatic missions of Mr. Asanbayev, former Vice-president, who was sent as an Ambassador to Germany, of former opposition leader Olzhas Suleymenov, Ambassador to Italy, former leader of the North Kazakhstan Region elite, former Vice-prime Mr.Tursunbayev - ex-ambassador to Turkey; the appointment of former Secretary for National Security, Vice-prime and founder of the Democratic Mr.Zhukeyev - Ambassador to South Korea; appointment of K.Sultanov, Ambassador to China and former Vice-prime, vice-speaker, and the founder of the Party of Demos's Unity of Kazakhstan; of M.Shakhanov, former leader of the movement for rehabilitation of the participants of 1986 December events and the former leader of the movement for the salvation of the Aral Sea and then the Ambassador to Kyrgyzstan, etc. give the clear evidence of such practice.

Other individuals possessing the talents of outstanding leaders have been also retired, among them are Akezhan Kazhegeldin, former Prime Minister, Petr Svoik, Former Minister, N. Shaykenov, former Vice-prime. G. Abilsiitov, former Vice-prime, and many others. Moreover Mr. Kazhegeldin was forced to leave the country and still has been living abroad. Today, there is no a little bit interesting or independent person in President machinery, the Cabinet, or the Parliament able to play the game of politics in the interest of the nation and state and to defend public interests. And those few not without a talent have been carefully concealing their ambitions.

It is quite obvious that the President mostly cares about his closest entourage personal loyalty to keep power rather than about business talents of Government members and national interests. The personalities of the recent years Cabinet, President Administration and the Parliament leaders and members give the clear evidence of such assertion: among them are S. Tereshchenko, N. Balgimbayev, K. Tokayev, S. Kalmurzayev, O. Baygeldi, A. Kekilbayev, O. Abdykarimov, Zh. Tuyakbayev, etc.

The policy of privatization in the interest of "the lads" and resources distribution personally by the state leader have resulted in the situation when the bureaucracy is totally selected by the personal loyalty feature, and, if there are any doubts in his loyalty or immoderate ambitions, the functionary is taken away from public authority. Often such Jesuitical methods are used when functionaries are resigned in an hour and after a certain period of oblivion, or to be the more precise after the test for loyalty, are reinstated. The shining examples are V. Mette, A. Zhabagin, G. Karagusova, etc.

As a result, the President succeeds in taking away undesirable persons and in achieving the high level of his bureaucratic "clients" consolidation and mobilization. The bureaucrats owe to the President personally their promotion and the possibility of obtaining resources. On such basis, he managed to increase the inner unity of bureaucracy, subordination of executive bodies, in particular, of force agencies. Besides, the President has won the greater support of Kazakh marginal circles for his policy on the basis of ethnic centrism.

It is his ethnocentric policy that hampers the consolidation of Kazakhstan counter-elite that has been in its stage of formation still. It is extremely heterogeneous, from ethnic and clannish, as well as social and economic points of view. On one hand, it was Kazakh political, intellectual and "business" elite that had been "shut", lost its influence and dominance, taken away from authority and have been now vegetating in province. However, on the other hand, the marginality of its Kazakh segment impedes its aging and structurization.

From time to time, a spontaneous potential leader of Kazakh opposition emerges but finally he either goes into direct huddle with ruling elite, as it was to Olzhas Suleymenov, Marat Ospanov, Baltash Tursunbayev, etc., or, due to his personal features he gets unable to act independently and form an alternative “patron-client” system as it happened to Galym Abilsiitov and others.

In present the opposition consolidates around the Forum of Democratic Forces. Former Prime-Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, Chair of the Republican Demos Party of Kazakhstan (RPPK) Executive Committee Gaziz Aldamzharov, leader of the social movement “Orleu” Seidakhmet Kuttykadam, one of the democratic part “Azamat” leaders Petr Svoik, leader of the pensioners movement “Pokolenie (Generation)” Irina Savostina and other Forum co-chairs play an important role in the Forum activity.

Talking about non-Kazakh counter-elite we should say that due to its imperative "illegitimacy" it is forced either to run "pure" business and try to influence the situation using intermediary ways, mostly via media or to support Kazakh counter-elite in its politics. But it is out of opportunities of direct influence upon taken decisions or direct participation in political life of the society anyway.

Is Kazakhstan demos capable to influence upon decisions taken by this elite? Are there any constitutional opportunities for that?

The reality of modern political situation is that present political and administrative elite is absolutely closed for the other part of the society. It imperatively eliminates any mechanisms and ways of demos influence upon taken decisions. Lack of local self-government, power bodies elections and mechanism of free demonstration of demos' will, lid of meetings, demonstrations and opposition activities, persecution and arrests of its leaders together with censorship and tight press upon media deprive demos of any chances to influence upon authorities and taken decisions. Political elite of Kazakhstan considers demos as the attribute of "reforms", but not their real participant. "Demos has to" construct and legalize the decisions of the supreme "Suzerain" and strictly implement his will into life, as it happened to two referendums on 1995 Constitution adoption and extension of the President's duties until 2000. However any demos' attempts to influence upon the situation and consider their political rights are roughly suppressed. The fix of Zhanatas leaders, persecution of Kentau leaders, arrests and detentions of P. Svoik, M. Eleusizov, I. Savostina, G. Abdilsiitov, and many other oppositionists as well as the imprisonment of M. Ismailov eloquently prove that.

The lively example of non-democratic character of power are presidential and parliamentary elections of 1999. Those elections demonstrated to the whole world the absence of honest and free elections in Kazakhstan. The elections results were grossly falsified and do not correspond with the demos will absolutely.

The answer to the question on the level of the political elite of Kazakhstan effectiveness lies also in this area. In present the political elite of Kazakhstan transformed into the family-clan organization with widespread infrastructure of "customers" serving it (either technocrats or illegitimate managers) and articulating its interests on the basis of cooperation mostly with offshore and transnational "business-elite".

The major weakness of modern political elite of Kazakhstan is extremely high level of power concentration and monopolization in the President's own hands. Nazarbaev partially understands that. As a result such a concentrated power is very subjective, capricious, inconsecutive and can be easily lost due to either disease or just the final point of the governor’s biological cycle. It is also pretty difficult to keep such an amount of power and control in one’s hands. In this case the President certainly becomes a hostage of power, his encirclement and technocrats. It gets more and more difficult for him to take optimal decisions. And the most important thing is that it gets harder and harder for him to overview the limits of his power. Everything outside the leader’s “view horizon” is unpunished and uncontrolled. For this reason it is OK for his encirclement to “satisfy own interests”.

The President having surrounded himself with barely literate “servicemen” is often unable to follow real events and often goes in the clear-way of ongoing processes. His advisors also give a bad service to the President when they blandish into the “master’s” eyes and publicly chant the praises of him in media. As a result demos is demoralized, fumed and unable to accept “impacts going from upper level”. The encirclement rallies over next upstart and authorities get into the banal ecstasy and are often unable to navigate the situation adequately.

At the same time the President tried to disseminate power responsibilities among various administrative bodies as much as possible. He even tried to set them off each other as much as possible so that none “branch” of power, none body, none power institution could compete with the presidential power. Positions of the Prime Minister are extremely diminished. Actually they are counterbalanced by equal functions of Vice-premiers, State Advisors, Presidential Administration leaders and even several ministries and state companies. The cabinet of ministers is actually nothing more than a “department” of the Presidential Administration. The Parliament is deprived of legislative initiative and control functions and can be dismissed any time. For this reason it “acts” as one of “departments” of the Presidential Administration.

It should be mentioned that on almost all post-soviet territory big and small presidents act by a common program: illegitimate referendums, illegal constitutions, non-democratic elections, enormous concentration of power, patron-client relations, trust to bureaucracy, corruption, nepotism and assignment of “their demos” to key positions. Parliaments deprived of real responsibilities and hourly expecting the dismiss, governments unable to rule the country, paralyzed prosecutor’s offices and courts and incapable law machinery stay on the second level.

The analysis of post-soviet political systems earnestly indicates that the process of concentrations of power in the hands of new “monarchs” (presidents) is a common tendency. All other bodies of power – parliaments, courts, etc., just play the assigned role of democracy mannequins. This is usually done under the slogan of reaching a real sovereignty and creation of the state system based on the principle of “distribution of power”, which is far from that in reality. Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan passed this scenario during last 5-7 years. Belarus was a bit late but A. Lukashenko does not want to stay back of his colleagues by presidential corps and in present goes ahead of lot of them.

The most interesting thing is that this system is reproduced on regional, city, district and township administration level. As territorial borders and the number of objects for management reduce, monopoly of power increases. Simultaneously the authorities outrage and malversations increase pro rata.

Despite of all attempts to form a strong executive vertical the monopolization of power almost everywhere leads to iniquity, chaos and disorder, non-consideration of laws and any decisions from the upper level, paralyze of state bodies and executive bodies crisis, domination of temporal officers and peculators, corruption, and flush of Mafia.

Among a huge complex of reasons of the crisis of power the most important one is that it does not correspond with the economic course, either declared, as in Kazakhstan, for instance, or really run by post-soviet countries. This course is based on anonymous market connections when the economic freedom (at least - limited) dictates the conditions of another state and power system design.

During the formation and genesis of bourgeois relations in Western Europe not just the state system was reformed but the reformation of religion took place as well. Requirement of political freedoms, political guaranties of human rights and as a result development of parliamentary democracy, which excluded monopolization of power by anyone and led to dissemination of power among as much free citizens as possible became the consecutive result of market development.

This consistent pattern of social development contradicts with the policy of present post-soviet presidents and puts doubt upon the character of "reforms" run by them. Thus, present political and administrative elite in Kazakhstan and other CIS countries as well makes a result just in a single positions (partially - budget, partially - financial and monetary policy, comprador privatization for encirclement, successful peculation) but for the whole country it is still destructive, ineffective and makes small results.

Just recruiting independent politicians enjoying demos trust and able to take responsibility for the destiny of the country into the present political elite can change the social and economic situation in the country by root and branch and make the decisions of the upper level effective for the country and society. The 1999 elections in Mazhilis and Senate in Kazakhstan demonstrated that the administrative elite is not eager to incorporate the representatives of demos and opposition.

Despite of internal ineffectiveness the political elite of Kazakhstan could make a progress in its movement towards economic independence from Russia. This is a real fact of present post-privatization phase. Transnational corporations and other agents of economic relations provided to Kazakhstan by their activities independence from Russia but not from world market and geopolitics. The political elite of Kazakhstan having made away with the state during post-privatization phase, having enormously feathered and having preserved personal unlimited power has however achieved independence from political elite of third countries for the charge of full tether to raw materials world markets conjuncture. This does not leave any space for expectations for economic system diversification and its independent functioning and improvement. Neocolonialist, actually comprador economic policy has already put Kazakhstan on the position of a “Third World” underdeveloped country and doomed the population of Kazakhstan to poverty and misery in the near perspective but given enormous dividends to modern political and administrative elite.

We can not avoid indicating that the interests of Kazakhstan comprador political elite, transnational and offshore corporations are very close and actually identical – all of them are interested just in territory and resources of Kazakhstan. Both political elite of Kazakhstan and the West consider the population as “free attachment to its territory and resources”, “extra mouths”, whom they have to share with by dividends from the territory. The unity of interests, corporate alliance and total mutual understanding between “pseudo-democrats”, “marketers-liberals”, “autoritarianists”, “national-traditionalists”, “compradors”, and “etatists-staters” is fully evident here. All this determines the support of the political elite of Kazakhstan and its policy by offshore business.

In this respect we should indicate that the political elite of Kazakhstan combines the nomenclature arrogance, administrative infantilism, aristocratic morgue, ethnocratic and clan traditionalism, soviet totalitarianism, pseudo-democratic, liberal and market-bourgeois rhetoric inside itself. It happens because the majority of them came from the soviet party and housing nomenclature and thus are the adherents of the concept of the plan managed economy and the state monopoly and strong dislike of Russian Administration and Moscow Center. Also lot of them came from rural areas and are thus adherents of ethnocentrism, traditionalism, xenophobia, civilized backwardness, etc. The majority of them got either distant party education or came from the party and housing nomenclature with dominating agriculture or engineering education. You can’t find scholars, intellectuals, real politicians, regional leaders, known individuals, and humanitarians among them. They made their careers in soviet party and housing corridors or just bought their positions with bribes and adulation.

Thus, it is pretty reasonable that there are no real democrats, individuals with strict principles, competent marketers, and others among them. We can list all those “no” forever. They became “communists” because they had no other choice. Now they became “market” liberals because it became easier to take care of their own interests this way. They also became democrats by necessity because modern practices of international relations and international law require that. They are “chameleons”. They mimicry in any conditions and get the color suitable to the particular situation. They are Muslims with Muslims, they are godfearing with Christians, they are traditionalists with traditionalists and democrats with democrats. They are best friends with Russia and USA. It happens because they are “none” in reality. Someone, who is stronger, can easily deal with them. It is harder for those, who are equal to them. And it is almost impossible to deal with them for those, who are lower. They replace the absence of culture and education by high ranks and statuses.

The administrative and managerial elite of Kazakhstan is ready to support its President. He put all of them before the cratch. Their favorite sentence is the slogan “no alternative to Nazarbaev”. Nursultan Nazarbaev is their ideal of politician. But it is easy to predict how will all this cohort of authorities behave itself in case of the governor’s biological cycle end. The country will be doomed to chaos and acerbate fight between various clans and groups. The President’s name will be totally grind out by them.

In this connection the question what will be further to political and administrative elite of Kazakhstan is of interest. Conflicts melting into confrontation will most likely become obvious during the "transitional" period when one authoritative leader transfer authority to another one. However at present the lack for personages on the country's horizon, concentration of authority in the hands of N.Nazarbayev in person, counter-elite activities in legal environment, the absence of professional army along with the complex of other conditions, in particular, the move of the capital from the only big country's city of Almaty to the country town of Akmola that has been renamed into Astana, will not result into conflicts for the time being.

The current situation also presents the answer to the question widely discussed - the question on the prospects for post-Soviet integration. In the conditions of non-critical support of Nazarbayev's pseudo-democratic and pseudo-liberal policy by the West and absolute concentration of authority in President's hands integration is out of question! Kazakhstani political and administrative elite making lucre of each hour and second of its mastery will never delegate authority or go to any integration.

In this connection the attention should be also drawn to another aspect of the problem of authority. The unreasonable concentration of power in the hands of the President as well as the removal of all potential competitors lead to a political vacuum at the national level. During the recent years not only individuals but complete political institutions and authority bodies have been being removed from the political stage, such as the Parliament, prosecutor's office, courts, opposition, political parties, trade unions. Now it is the turn of the Cabinet. Nursultan Nazarbayev's desire to fill in the whole state and political "niche" of supreme power like Saparmurat Niyazov has done, is unlikely to be realizable. Moreover, such idee fixe would make the authority much more weak and assailable.

Political life is known to brook no vacuum as well as the redundant authority concentration. The vacuum must be filled in. In our opinion, the trend of regional and local leaders formation is obvious. These leaders are absolutely unknown at the national level. I would call them local counter-elite that operates like the corporation of "field commanders" and emerges in a transitional period like the rust that means that the metal will be destroyed soon.

I will put the current state of Kazakhstani political elite as a formula 'The more power, the less it is effective or efficient" for the country, state and nation. The colossal concentration of the national level authority in the hands of President Nursultan Nazarbayev, removal of potential competitors and disavowal of other public and political institutions and bodies have resulted in the power vacuum and decline in its weight and influence both at horizontal and vertical levels. The authority's inability to meet public demands and satisfy public needs result in the situation when the society has been gradually elaborating its autonomous, independent from the central authority methods of conflict resolution. Naturally, these methods have to personify in the figures of local leaders, which reminds of the situation that took place in Somalia under the rule of M. Siad Barre. It is a well-known hat happened to this country further.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize the one more significant aspect of presidential regiment operation. It is about the monarch-presidents' power continuity. Provisionally, I would point to just one particular feature. In the countries where monarch-presidents have their real inheritors willing to inherit from their "founder father", the supreme authority is a little bit "kinder" as the "bridges will not be burnt". However in the countries where presidents have not got inheritors, as it is, for example, in Turkmenistan, the regiments are more tough and they are of the more "cult" character as the regiment's psychology is like "tho' deluge after us"

Thus, Kazakhstani political elite is represented, first of all, by President Nazarbayev himself, his family and the closest entourage. The wide stratum of administrative elite composed of public officers serves their interests. The power interior structure and recruitment of elite is based on "patron - client" relations. The elite ideology is the ideology of state sovereignty and unitary state. They have been extremely efficient in absorbing interests for themselves. However it is inefficient from the point of view of the state, society and demos. Marginal in its origin and lumpenized and declassed in its essence, Kazakhstani elite is an extremely closed and corrupted. It prevents free declaration of will of electorate as well as the control of its activities. At the same time it is unable to carry out efficient social and political policy in the country.